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The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their 
significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed 
back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be 
read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-
familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution 
during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that 
shows how the history of these concepts is bound up with the origins and 
development of analytic philosophy itself. Understanding how these concepts 
were taken up, transfigured, and given up by the early analytic philosophers, 
enables us to recover and reanimate the debate amongst them that otherwise 
remains Delphic. This book begins from the early, originating texts of analytic 
philosophy that have hitherto baffled commentators, including Moore’s early 
papers, and engages afresh with the neglected contributions of philosophical 
figures that historians of analytic philosophy have mostly since forgotten, 
including Stout and Whitehead. This sheds new light upon the relationships of 
Moore to Russell, Russell to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein to Ramsey.
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Oxford University Press, 2018 
Introduction 
Should we not distrust the jaunty assurance with which every age prides itself 
that it at last has hit upon the ultimate concepts in which all that happens can 
be formulated? (A.N. Whitehead, Concept of Nature, 1921) 
This is a new history and a new kind of history of early analytic philosophy. It 
provides an original perspective upon the origins and development of our subject by 
examining hitherto neglected texts and figures that have been pushed out of the 
limelight into the shadows, text and figures that have previously been ignored or 
dismissed as weak or even as unintelligible, explaining their arguments and revealing 
their insights. These texts and figures aren’t interpreted in isolation from one another. 
There’s an unfolding narrative, the reconstruction of a thirty-year span of dispute and 
dialogue amongst the most luminous and enterprising philosophers of their day, a 
narrative whose uniting theme is the understanding and evolution of the intertwined 
concepts of universal and particular and the distinction between them. This also 
makes it the first ever history of these concepts in early analytic philosophy. And it’s 
exceptional as a contribution to the history of analytic philosophy, or even analytic 
philosophy, because it’s meant as a real genealogy, in a sense Nietzsche would have 
recognized, rather than a fictional one, as most philosophical genealogies have been. 
The actual historical account of the concepts of particular and universal is used to 
reveal that it was far from inevitable that philosophy today should have come to take 
the particular-universal distinction for granted as a piece of first philosophy. 
G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell are usually credited with being the founding 
fathers of analytic philosophy—Moore coming first, Russell following closely in his 
footsteps. But Moore’s founding works from the late 1890s are typically overlooked 
or dismissed as confused or incomprehensible. So even though Russell is supposed to 
have started from behind, the prevailing impression is that Russell soon overtook 
Moore, as Wittgenstein was later to overtake Russell. But this is all mistaken. We 
shouldn’t let Russell overshadow Moore in our appreciation, anymore than we should 
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allow Wittgenstein to overshadow Russell. This book provides an account of Moore’s 
early work as perfectly cogent but rejecting the distinction between particular and 
universal. Of course the famous image of Russell following closely in Moore’s 
footsteps comes from Russell’s own intellectual autobiography but he only came up 
with it six decades later (1959: 42). It would have been more accurate for Russell to 
say that he and Moore danced together. Sometimes one led, sometimes the other, on 
occasion they stepped upon one another’s toes. This book goes deeper than ever 
before into the philosophical as well as historical intricacies of Moore and Russell’s 
dance. It also delivers a new account of the relationship between Russell and 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is typically cast as having devastated Russell with his 
criticisms of the multiple relation theory of judgement. But Wittgenstein’s criticisms 
weren’t compelling and the picture theory of the Tractatus is explained in this book as 
emerging out of one of Russell’s own suggestions. 
Whilst Moore and Russell are usually credited with parentage, it’s Frege that is 
usually accorded the honorific ‘grandfather of analytic philosophy’.1 This book builds 
a novel case that it was an engagement with Kant that lay behind the early efforts of 
Moore and Russell, so it’s Kant rather than Frege that stands behind analytic 
philosophy as it emerged in the late 1890s. The case isn’t merely that at the time they 
had read Kant but hadn’t read Frege, although this is certainly true. What this book 
brings to light is the fact that Kant himself had problematized the concepts of 
particular and universal in the Critique of Pure Reason as Hume has problematized 
the concept of causation in the Treatise. Otherwise inscrutable passages of Moore and 
Russell are then made intelligible for the first time as a reaction to Kant’s critical 
treatment of the particular-universal distinction. The real grandfathers of analytic 
philosophy were A.N. Whitehead and G.F. Stout. Moore and Russell didn’t only read 
them but Whitehead taught Russell and Stout taught both Moore and Russell. So 
there’s no need for an invisible hand explanation to account for the influence of Stout 
and Whitehead. Their now neglected efforts to undermine the particular-universal 
distinction are expounded and given their due place here. 
The period this book primarily explores and illuminates runs up until 1926, the 
year that H.W.B. Joseph, F.P. Ramsey, and R. Braithwaite contributed to an 
                                                
1 See Dummett 1994: 26 and Burge 2005: 1. 
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Aristotelian Society symposium on ‘Universals and the “Method of Analysis”’. Their 
subject was Ramsey’s paper ‘Universals’, published the previous year in Mind. In 
‘Universals’ Ramsey had argued against the a priori division of what exists into two 
classes, particulars and universals.2 His paper beguiled and baffled its readers 
straightaway but nobody really doubted it was an important and challenging paper. 
Subsequently ‘Universals’ earned inclusion in the analytic philosophical canon. But 
what exactly did Ramsey mean? There has been no consensus amongst his 
commentators. But this is because trying to understand Ramsey’s ‘Universals’ in 
isolation is like trying to understand the significance of the last few lines of a 
telephone conversation you’ve overheard, but only from one end when you don’t 
know what went before. This book approaches ‘Universals’ in an unprecedented 
fashion, explaining ‘Universals’ as the closing stage of a conversation that had been 
going on since the emergence of analytic philosophy in the late 1890s, a conversation 
inspired by Kant. 
The development of the early analytic philosophers’ thinking about particulars 
and universals, I will argue, has the contours of an unfolding Hegelian dialectic. It’s 
well known that they advocated ontological pluralism, affirming the existence of 
many things; they set themselves against ontological monism, the doctrine that there 
is only one thing. But what’s almost invariably overlooked is that the early analytic 
philosophers experimented and seriously entertained different answers to the 
question: how many categories of things are there? By ‘categorial dualism’ I will 
mean the a priori doctrine that there are exactly two categories of things, particulars 
and universals—where ‘thing’ means a constituent of a fact or a sub-factual 
ingredient of reality. But by ‘categorial monism’ I will mean not merely the a priori 
doctrine that there is only one category of thing. I will also mean, more radically, that 
the category recognized is neither the category of particular nor the category of 
universal but some category that supersedes them both. So by these lights, neither 
many varieties of nominalism nor many varieties of realism count as forms of 
categorial monism. They don’t because either they say that there are things to be 
found on one side of the particular-universal distinction but not the other or vice 
versa. By contrast, categorial monism rejects the distinction outright. By ‘categorial 
                                                
2 See MacBride 2005b for alternative arguments, different but complementary to Ramsey’s, 
in favour of scepticism about the particular–universal distinction. 
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pluralism’ I will mean the doctrine that there are potentially many categories of thing, 
their character and number revealed a posteriori as nature is disclosed to us. 
As analytic philosophy emerged and advanced ventre á terre, each of these 
doctrines was successively adopted. 
Categorial Monism ⇒ Categorial Dualism ⇒ Categorial Pluralism 
When Moore burst upon the scene with his ‘New Philosophy’ in the 1890s, he 
espoused categorial monism, his ontological inventory consisting solely of mind-
independent concepts, where concepts are conceived by Moore to be neither 
particulars nor universals. After this initial revolutionary period, Moore and Russell 
took a reactionary turn, swinging back to embrace the traditional dualism of particular 
and universal, i.e. categorial dualism. But Moore had his doubts, backed up by 
Whitehead, and as the early decades of the twentieth century unfolded, analytic 
philosophy was pushed inexorably towards categorial pluralism, the doctrine that 
there are potentially many categories, not just one or two. The Zeitgeist came to rest 
with Wittgenstein and Ramsey. They denied the necessity of shoehorning a priori 
whatever there might turn out to be into any simple-minded onefold or twofold 
scheme (categorial monism or dualism). 
In this book I undertake a task never undertaken before, that of expounding and 
explaining the intellectual processes whereby this dialectic unfolded. The New 
Philosophy had its origins in Moore’s second Fellowship dissertation, The 
Metaphysical Basis of Ethics, and Russell’s An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning, 
both written in the summer of 1898, works in which Moore and Russell were still 
influenced by Kant. To set the stage for the emergence of the New Philosophy, I 
argue in chapter 1 that Kant conceived the particular-universal distinction to be a 
piece of synthetic a priori knowledge. As a piece of synthetic a priori knowledge Kant 
recognized that this distinction was no less epistemologically precarious than Hume 
had found the Principle of Causality to be or the Axioms of Euclidean geometry.3 I 
explain how Kant valiantly struggled, but failed, to vindicate the particular-universal 
distinction as a piece of synthetic a priori knowledge. In the Metaphysical Deduction 
Kant proposed to derive the categories from the general forms of judgement. But the 
Metaphysical Deduction wasn’t fit for purpose, an especially visible weak spot in 
                                                
3 See MacBride 1999 and 2005c for a contemporary working out of Humean scepticism about 
the particular-universal distinction independent of Kant’s framework. 
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Kant’s plan for vindicating the a priori status of the categories. This account of Kant 
isn’t offered merely as a reconstruction of a neglected episode in the history of the 
theory of universals, although it is. Rather because the Metaphysical Deduction failed, 
the thought becomes available and salient that we cannot validly read off the 
categories from our familiar manners of thinking and talking about the world. It was 
recognition that Kant’s transcendental idealism had this weakness that provided an 
important stimulus to the development of analytic philosophy. 
Against this backdrop I provide an account of the genesis of the New Philosophy 
in terms of Moore’s rejection of Kant’s idealism. The resulting system, examined in 
chapter 2, emerged from Moore’s work on his second dissertation and was published 
in his ‘Nature of Judgment’ (1899). In Moore’s early system, the world is conceived 
as the totality of propositions, whether true or false, where propositions and their 
building blocks, called ‘concepts’ by Moore, are conceived as maximally mind 
independent. In Chapter 3, I argue that the concepts of Moore’s early system are 
neither particulars nor universals. They aren’t because Moore understood the 
categories of particular and universal as Kant had done, in terms of predication. But 
Moore doubted that the subject-predicate form belonged to the depth form of our 
descriptions of reality where concepts are expressed and conjured. As part of his 
rejection of the idealist outlook, Moore recognized a level of description underneath 
the level at which Kant applied the categories. 
In his Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning, Russell had sought to update and 
extend Kant’s classification of judgement forms to reflect the logical variety of 
mathematical judgements. Nonetheless the Analysis was a conservative work insofar 
as Russell continued in this work to hold onto a version of the particular-universal 
distinction, indeed putting forward arguments in its favour that were destined to 
subsequently sway both him and Moore. In chapter 4 I explain how Russell 
abandoned his Kantian outlook and became a convert to the New Philosophy Moore 
had put forward in ‘The Nature of Judgment’. I show in the subtext to Russell’s 
lectures on Leibniz, delivered in 1899 but published as A Critical Exposition of the 
Philosophy of Leibniz (1900), how Russell developed his own arguments for 
categorial monism, significantly arguments based upon the inscrutability of 
particulars. Indeed his unpublished paper ‘On the Classification of Relations’ (1899) 
anticipates the most famous argument of Ramsey’s ‘Universals’ against the 
particular-universal distinction. 
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But things didn’t stand still—such was the restless energy of the innovators of the 
New Philosophy. In 1901 Moore reinvented the particular-universal distinction and so 
categorial dualism supplanted categorial monism as the official doctrine of the New 
Philosophy. Chapter 5 is devoted to an exposition and explanation of Moore’s 
‘Identity’, perhaps the darkest, most baffling paper in the early analytic corpus, the 
paper in which Moore argued for the categorial dualism he favoured in the early years 
of the twentieth century. But things didn’t ossify there either. Doubts began to creep 
back into Moore’s mind and before the decade was done Moore was wondering 
whether categorial dualism was really too crude a scheme to accommodate the logical 
variety of the judgements we truly make about reality. Meanwhile, Whitehead was en 
route from being a mathematician to being a metaphysician; the philosophy of nature 
Whitehead developed during the 1910s and 20s led him to a similar conclusion about 
the particular-universal distinction as Moore had already done in his lectures. For 
Whitehead, the particular-universal distinction was just a piece of Weltanschauung, a 
fragment of an Aristotelian mind-set that requires us to straitjacket what exists into a 
simple-minded division between particulars and universals, a binary division that 
cannot be adequate to the extraordinary manifold diversity nature exhibits. In chapter 
6, I explain Moore’s change of heart about categorial dualism, as evidenced in his 
1910-11 lectures, and I chart the course of Whitehead’s intellectual development 
towards categorial pluralism. 
At the same time G.F. Stout was undertaking his own journey from being a 
psychologist and a philosopher of psychology in the 1890s to being a metaphysician 
in the 1920s. Like Moore in ‘The Nature of Judgment’ and Russell in The Philosophy 
of Leibniz, Stout was an opponent of categorial dualism. In the place of the categories 
of substance and attribute, Stout recommended a metaphysical scheme of abstract 
particulars or tropes, an alternative version of categorial monism. In chapter 7 I 
provide a novel account of Stout’s pioneering arguments for this one-category 
scheme. In a famous exchange with Stout in 1923, Moore set himself against abstract 
particulars and tropes. Whilst Moore’s case against Stout was found convincing by a 
generation of philosophers, it has recently become received wisdom that Moore failed 
even to grasp the basics of Stout’s categorial monism. But I argue, against received 
wisdom, that Stout’s version of categorial monism was crippled by its failure to 
account for predication in general, a flaw that Moore exposed in his exchange with 
Stout but Stout could not remedy. 
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Whilst Moore had come to be doubtful once more of categorial dualism by 1910, 
Russell continued to espouse categorial dualism in one form or other, advancing from 
a Kantian to a more Fregean orientation. In chapter 8, I explain how Russell’s 
conception of the particular-universal distinction evolved and deepened as a result of 
tandem changes in his thinking about the nature of judgement and the nature of 
relations. This provides a new perspective upon the dispute between Russell and 
Wittgenstein about the multiple relation theory of judgement. Russell wasn’t 
confounded by Wittgenstein’s criticisms at all—as so many commentators suppose. In 
chapter 9, I explain how developing the picture theory out of a proto-version Russell 
had already conjured with in 1906 led Wittgenstein to embrace categorial pluralism in 
the Tractatus (1919/1922). As a consequence of his pictorial conception of 
representation, Wittgenstein was led to the conclusion that the general propositional 
form ‘such and such is the case’ marks the limit of what can be deduced a priori about 
what we say or judge. But if nothing less general about the form of propositions can 
be deduced then a fortiori we cannot deduce a priori any more specific forms of 
judgement. It’s then a consequence of Wittgenstein’s picture theory that we cannot 
determine a priori that our judgements will have the specific forms of judgements 
about particulars and universals. What specific forms our judgements take can only be 
revealed a posteriori. So Wittgenstein embraced categorial pluralism. 
The culmination of this intellectual episode comes with Ramsey’s ‘Universals’ 
(1925) and his subsequent elucidations in ‘Universals and the “Method of Analysis”’ 
(1926). ‘Universals’ has been almost invariably read in isolation. But ‘Universals’ is a 
refraction of so much of the philosophy that was cutting edge in 1920s Cambridge, 
the philosophy Ramsey had imbibed so much of during his remarkable hothousing 
education.4 As a result, Ramsey’s critics, as well as philosophers who have thought 
themselves fellow travellers, have often failed to understand him, their reflections 
upon him beside the point. In chapter 10, I remedy the defect of reading ‘Universals’ 
in isolation. Ramsey’s case for categorial pluralism is explained in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Whitehead’s philosophy of nature, and Russell’s 
introduction to the 2nd edition of Principia Mathematica (1925). 
                                                
4 See his sister, Margaret Paul’s memoir of Ramsey (Paul 1912). 
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The perspective that emerges from Wittgenstein and Ramsey’s complementary 
reflections is one whereby questions about what things exist and what categories of 
things there are cannot be answered separately. Rather, according to Wittgenstein and 
Ramsey, the existence of things and their categories are progressively revealed 
together, a posteriori, as the course of nature unfolds. So expressed, Wittgenstein and 
Ramsey embrace a naturalistic approach to ontology. Naturalism has a familiar ring to 
us, because we’re intellectually downstream from Quine. Categorial pluralism sounds 
less familiar a doctrine. But if naturalism is congenial to us, should we not embrace 
Wittgenstein and Ramsey’s outlook on ontology too? If we already embrace 
naturalism, shouldn’t we bring our meta-ontology into harmony with our conception 
of meaning and mind?5 And if we’re not already naturalists, an appreciation of 
Wittgenstein and Ramsey’s arguments creates an epistemic context in which we 
cannot continue to accept categorial dualism as an article of metaphysical faith. This 
also raises a new and surprising question for the history of our discipline. How did 
analytic philosophy manage to get from the naturalistic perspective achieved in the 
early decades of the twentieth century to where we are now in the twenty-first, where 
so many of us take the particular-universal distinction to be a priori? 
                                                
5 See MacBride 2014a and MacBride and Janssen-Lauret 2015 for arguments in favour of a 
naturalist outlook on the categories from a contemporary perspective. 
